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Abstract 
Although the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – a policy tool aimed at fostering 
mutual policy learning between EU member states – adds an EU dimension to national 
policies, no competences are shifted to the EU level. In addition, the OMC promises to 
involve a broad range of actors, among which members of parliament. Scholars have 
studied the OMC employment and OMC social inclusion and showed that the OMC 
breaks this promise by affecting the national policy making process outside of the control 
of national parliaments. This paper investigates the involvement of two national 
parliaments across three under-researched OMCs, related with the knowledge-based 
society theme. 
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Introduction 
 
Almost a decade after the launch of the Lisbon strategy, time has arrived to assess the 
effects of the strategy that aimed to turn the EU in the most competitive, dynamic and 
social cohesive society in the world in just ten years. In this context a vast amount of 
scholars has paid attention to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), a policy tool 
codified in the Lisbon presidency conclusions and adopted on a variety of policy fields to 
reach the ambitious Lisbon goals. The OMC consists of target-setting between national 
governments of the member states of the European Union with the ultimate aim of 
starting a learning process between national governments about how to respond with 
national policies to universal political and social challenges (Chalmers and Lodge 2003: 
17). In order to safeguard the effectiveness and input legitimacy of the OMC this learning 
process should be ‘open’, i.e. involve a broad range of (non-)state actors such as NGOs 
and national parliaments.  
Until now the impact of OMCs on national policies received by far the most 
scholarly attention. More recently political scientists are developing an interest in the 
involvement of national parliaments (Borrás and Conzelmann 2007; Duina and Raunio 
2007; Benz 2007). This paper investigates the scrutiny national parliaments exercise in 
practice over OMCs and explains variation in parliamentary involvement of the Dutch 
and British Upper and Lower Houses across three OMCs related with the knowledge-
based society theme. Four hypotheses are formulated, predicting respectively, marginal 
involvement of parliaments in OMCs, conditional involvement, stronger involvement of   3   
parliaments functioning in a consensus democracy, and more involvement of parliaments 
with strong EU affairs committees. 
 The next section introduces the main characteristics of the OMC, discusses its 
effect on policy-making processes in the member states, and the problems created by the 
low involvement of national parliaments for the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy 
of the OMC. Subsequently, the literature on the involvement of national parliaments in 
OMCs is critically reflected upon and a need for a comparative analysis across 
parliaments and under-researched OMCs is identified. In a third step the four hypotheses 
are formulated and information on the data collection and analysis is provided. Fourth, 
empirical results are presented on the involvement of two parliaments in three OMCs. 
The concluding section discusses the hypotheses in light of the empirical findings, the 
limitations of the study, and topics for future research.. 
 
The OMC: infrastructure, effect, and national parliaments  
 
The heads of state and government of the EU member states codified the OMC in 2000 
by including four elements in the Lisbon presidency conclusions, together forming the 
institutional infrastructure of an OMC (Council of the European Union 2000). The 
complete infrastructure of the OMC consists of i) guidelines or objectives, ii) indicators 
and benchmarks, iii) reporting via National Action Plans (NAPs), iv) peer learning 
groups. In subsequent years these four elements came to function as a template for 
implementing OMCs on various policy fields related with the Lisbon goals; i.e. social 
inclusion, pensions, health care, education, research and development and internet   4   
policy
1. Due to the use of this template, national governments play the central role in all 
OMCs; they approve by qualified majority in the Council the guidelines, indicators and 
benchmarks on which the different national policies are scored, and formulate NAPs in 
which it is specified how they plan to improve their policies. The respective European 
Commission DGs and experts of national ministries identify the factors that cause a 
national policy to perform best and review the NAPs and policies of the member states in 
peer learning groups. After the multilateral surveillance of national policies, the 
Commission and the Council draw up a joint report in which a summary is given of the 
progress made in each member state towards the objectives. Only in the case of the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) the Commission issued – until 2005 – non-
binding country-specific policy recommendations. 
Despite the non-binding character of OMCs, research on the EES showed that the 
OMC can have an indirect effect on national policy making processes in the member 
states through (re-)framing issues and problems (López-Santana 2006). A first element of 
the EES through which such a framing effect can occur is the European Employment 
Guidelines. These guidelines define common European problems that domestic policy-
makers should act upon. A second framing effect occurs when individual 
recommendations to a member state trigger a discussion about why a condition (i.e. an 
event, a situation) should be defined by domestic policy makers as a problem. Third, the 
EU can highlight relative disadvantages and advantages by providing explicit 
performance comparisons in an OMC through qualitative indicators and benchmarks 
across member states. If a member state is not achieving what others are accomplishing 
                                                 
1 Although the Lisbon Council is often seen as the birth of the OMC, the inspiration for this template was 
drawn from the European Employment Strategy, in function since 1998. The term OMC employment and 
EES will both be used in this paper to refer to this OMC.   5   
then this relative disadvantage is framed as a domestic problem. Through these three 
framing effects a condition can be framed into a problem, and domestic policy-makers 
are persuaded to construct their proposals within the framework set by the OMC (López-
Santana 2006; Bruno et. al. 2006). This framework is not an uncontroversial definition of 
sound policies but is touching upon issues of public interest and substantively affects the 
redistributive outcomes of policy making, often even before policies are debated in 
national parliaments (Tsakatika 2007: 550; Kröger 2007: 658; Duina and Raunio 2007: 
502). 
The latter finding has led several authors to conclude that the OMC is 
undermining the democratic legitimacy of the national political system in member states 
when viewed from a liberal democracy
2 perspective. This conclusion is often presented 
as the rationale for studying the involvement of national parliaments in OMCs. This 
paper departs from a different rationale and claims that the undermining effect of framing 
through the OMC is exaggerated in the literature. In fact, national governments are on a 
daily basis confronted with frames from which they can choose – e.g. from ministries, the 
media, independent think tanks, advisory councils, international organizations – without 
that the parliament is informed on the full range and origin of the choices. After one of 
the frames is taken as point of departure by a national government for developing new 
policies, it still is the national parliament that ultimately decides on the policy proposal of 
the government. This enables parliamentarians to reject the underlying frame of a policy 
                                                 
2 In this paper a liberal democracy perspective is chosen, focusing on the involvement of national 
parliaments. A second perspective on the democratic legitimacy of OMCs that can be adopted departs from 
the claim that ‘arguing’ in an open public debate between free and equal citizens is at the core of 
democratic governance. To assess the democratic quality of soft modes of governance from this 
‘deliberative democracy’ perspective it is needed to assess the possibility for direct and uninhibited societal 
input, the control of power asymmetries and the presence of arguing in the decision-making process 
(Borrás and Conzelmann 2007: 540; see also De La Porte and Nanz 2004; Smismans 2004; Friedrich 2006; 
Radulova 2007; Kröger 2007; Benz 2007).   6   
proposal made to them, even when originating in an OMC. Hence, the OMC does not 
undermine the democratic legitimacy of national political systems through its framing 
effect on the national policy making process. 
However, there are several valid reasons for studying the role of national 
parliaments in OMCs. First, the architects of the OMC made ‘openness’ one of the 
defining characteristics of the method in order to ensure the input legitimacy of the OMC 
and, accordingly, included in the institutional design the promise to involve stakeholders. 
This study will shed light on whether the OMC is able to uphold this promise. Second, 
the involvement of national parliaments is crucial for the effectiveness of OMCs. The 
OMC can only be an effective method when governments are held to account for policies 
that are under multilateral surveillance by the OMC. Without the involvement of national 
legislatures there will be no actor that can formally hold the government accountable for 
the performance of national policies in cross-national policy comparisons. As a result, the 
pressure on government to adjust its policies in case of underperformance is reduced. 
Hence, studying the involvement of national parliaments in OMCs provides insight on 
the extent to which the OMC can contribute to the ambitious Lisbon goals. 
 
The involvement of national parliaments in methods of open coordination 
 
Earlier studies on the involvement of national parliaments in OMCs provide support for 
the deparliamentarisation-thesis; i.e. parliamentarians do not have control over the 
decisions taken on the EU level with regard to the institutional development of the OMC   7   
and are unable to scrutinize the output of the OMC (Duina and Raunio 2007). This claim 
forms the core of the first hypothesis that will be assessed in this article. 
 
H1: national parliaments are unwilling and unable to scrutinize OMCs. 
 
Scholars claim that parliamentarians are not interested in following OMC processes 
because judge the impact of the OMC on the national policy making process as marginal 
(Duina and Raunio 2007: 298-299; Kerber and Eckhardt 2007). Moreover, it is claimed 
that parliamentarians are not able to scrutinize OMCs. Unlike normal EU legislation, the 
OMC does not have a clear beginning or end, or rules guiding the behaviour of actors. 
This makes the OMC hard to follow (Raunio 2006).  
There are also factors on the side of national executives that can hinder 
parliaments to scrutinise OMCs. In all OMCs representatives of national governments are 
involved in drawing up NAPs and Joint Reports and participate in peer learning groups 
on the EU level. As a result, information becomes concentrated in the executive branch 
(Raunio 2006). Moreover, effective deliberation in an OMC peer learning group requires 
intense in-group communication among actors involved. This creates a dense network of 
government representatives from different member states which cannot be controlled by 
external actors as these networks are usually unknown to them (Benz 2007: 515). There 
is anecdotal evidence that national governments used this distance between the national 
parliamentary arena and the OMC arena to prevent criticism on national policies voiced 
on the EU level from coming through in national parliaments (Jacobbson 2005: 123; 
Visser 2005: 199-200; Raunio 2006: 130; Kröger 2007; Tsakatika 2007).   8   
While earlier studies provided empirical support for the deparliamentarisation-
thesis, more recently scholars claim that a meaningful parliamentary scrutiny of OMCs 
can take place when certain conditions are fulfilled. Duina and Raunio present empirical 
findings on how the presence of NAPs and Joint Reports in OMCs allows opposition 
parties at the national level to acquire information that can be used to criticise the policies 
of national executives (Duina and Raunio 2007: 498). According to Benz, however, it is 
quite likely that in a party political context the government will dismiss the negative 
messages on national policies as ignoring the particularities of the national context. 
Moreover, the NAPs and Joint Reports that are discussed in OMCs are all drawn up by 
the national government (in cooperation with the Commission in the case of Joint 
Reports). Hence, national parliaments have to rely on information that can be 
manipulated by the government (Benz 2007: 516). Benz claims that the only way to 
ensure the involvement of national parliaments in OMCs is by increasing cross-national 
policy comparisons on a competitive basis. This means that simple benchmarks and 
ranking of the policy performance of member states according to indicators need to be 
present in OMCs, ‘so that experts and policy makers of national ministries participating 
in the OMC network are not needed to interpret the results of the OMC’ (Benz 2007: 
518). This claim leads to a second hypothesis. 
 
H2: when simple benchmarks are present in an OMC and policy performances of 
member states are ranked according to indicators, parliamentarians can and will use the 
information from the OMC arena to hold their government accountable for the 
performance of national policies vis-à-vis other member state policies.    9   
 
Benz does not find any empirical evidence in current studies of the OMC – which are all 
focused on the OMC employment and the OMC social inclusion – that hint at empirical 
support for this hypothesis, but indicates that other OMCs have developed on which 
much is still unclear. Hence, there is a strong need for comparative research across under 
researched OMCs. 
Apart from a need for comparative research across under researched OMCs, this 
study claims that country-specific differences influence the degree of scrutiny a national 
parliament exercises. It can be expected that parliaments will exercise scrutiny over 
OMCs in a different way depending on the institutional structure of the democratic 
system in a country, i.e. in either a majoritarian or consensus model of democracy 
(Lijphart 1999). In a majoritarian model such as that of the UK, the one-party 
government of the day has an assured majority among members of parliament and can 
rely on getting all of its legislation through. Because of this executive dominance, the 
parliament in the Westminster majoritarian system is labeled as a ‘talking assembly’, 
with the opposition seeing its role as criticizing the government rather than work together 
to arrive at better legislation in parliamentary committees (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 
2000). Hence, the government in a majoritarian model will be less inclined to provide 
information on the performance of national policies voiced in the OMC arena on the EU 
level – especially when negative on the policies of the incumbent government – and is 
more eager to push its own policies through, regardless of objections of the opposition 
parties. In a consensus model of democracy (e.g. the Netherlands), governments consist 
of multiple parties, have a genuine give-and-take relationship with parliament and try to   10   
find broad consensus for their plans (Hague & Harrop 2001; Tans 2007). The close 
collaboration between government and parliament and the presence of a strong 
specialized committee system led to assigning the label of ‘working assembly’ to 
parliaments functioning in a consensus model of democracy (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 
2000). This less confrontational attitude of governments and parliaments in consensus 
models, makes it more likely that information is provided by the government to 
parliament on the performance of national policies in the OMC arena – even when this 
information is unfavorable for the policies of the incumbent government. This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Parliaments in consensus democracies are likely to receive more information from 
their government on the OMC and its output, which leads to a stronger involvement in 
OMCs when compared to parliaments in majoritarian democracies. 
 
Another country-specific difference that can have an influence on the involvement of a 
national parliament in the OMC is the strength of the parliamentary EU affairs committee 
in a member state parliament (Jacobbson 2005: 109, 111). In classifications of 
parliaments with regard to their EU scrutiny rights that can be found in the literature, the 
Danish parliament is seen as exercising the strictest parliamentary control because can 
mandate ministers and as such is able ‘to formulate its own political assumptions about 
the daily EU business’ (Maurer & Wessels 2001). In countries such as Austria, Sweden 
and Finland the scrutiny system is less binding for government but parliaments are 
nevertheless seen as strong policy makers (Maurer & Wessels 2001). The Netherlands   11   
and Germany are seen to follow suit, as their parliaments carry out in-depth scrutiny of 
EU legislation but are committed to avoid confrontations with their government. The 
French and the British parliaments are seen as cases of modest policy-making 
legislatures. Both parliaments are able to voice their opinions on EU legislation by way 
of reports, resolutions and so called parliamentary scrutiny reserves. However, they are 
not able to fundamentally change or amend a governmental position on EU affairs 
(Maurer & Wessels 2001). On the other side of the spectrum we find countries such as 
Greece and Portugal that are seen to have weak scrutiny powers when it comes to EU 
affairs (Wessels & Maurer 2001; Hegeland & Neuhold 2002; Raunio 2005). In this paper 
it is claimed that the strength of an EU affairs committee in a member state parliament is 
positively related to the parliamentary involvement in an OMC. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H4: The more an EU affairs committee in a member state parliament is scrutinizing the 
activities of the national government at the EU level, the more members of parliament in 
this committee are able and willing to scrutinize OMCs.  
 
Cases and methods 
 
Scholars focused until now primarily on the EES and the OMC social inclusion to asses 
the parliamentary involvement in member states. In contrast, this paper studies under 
researched OMCs, all applied to a theme that became over the last 10 years more 
important on the national and European political agenda; i.e. the knowledge-based   12   
society. Accordingly, the OMC education, OMC R&D and the OMC e-Europe were 
studied. Two of the three OMCs under study – the OMC education and OMC R&D – 
have few but simple and focused benchmarks/targets and explicitly rank the policy 
performance of member states on indicators
3. Hence, the second hypothesis predicts for 
these OMCs a stronger involvement of parliaments than for the OMC e-Europe, which 
remained largely underdeveloped institutionally in the period 1999-2008. 
The involvement of parliaments was measured through coding parliamentary 
documents such as letters of ministers to parliaments, minutes of plenary debates and 
debates in committees, questions of MPs and answers of the ministers, and policy 
documents discussed in parliament. The documents for coding were selected through 
using search strings including references to the European Union, the policy field on 
which the OMC is adopted, the OMC as such, and elements/output of the OMC such as 
National Action Plans, National Reform Programmes, peer learning, Joint Reports, 
indicators and benchmarks.  
The extensive coding of parliamentary documents was executed for the Upper and 
Lower houses in the UK and the Netherlands
4, respectively a majoritarian and consensus 
model of democracy. The EU affairs committees in the Dutch parliament are stronger 
than the EU affairs committees in the British House of Commons and House of Lords 
                                                 
3 Five benchmarks were defined in the OMC education – with a time schedule running till 2010 – touching 
upon the following themes: i) early school leavers; ii) young people with upper secondary education; iii) 
low-achieving 15 year-olds in reading; iv) graduates in mathematics; v) participation in lifelong learning 
(European Commission 2004). To measure the progress on these benchmarks, 8 key issues were identified, 
with 29 concrete indicators to rank the performance of member state education policies (De Ruiter 2009). 
The Barcelona Council of 2002 formulated two concrete objectives for the OMC R&D: i) an increase in 
R&D investment in all member states from 1.9% of GDP in 2000 to 3% in 2010 and, ii) an increased share 
of business funding that should reach 2/3 of total R&D expenditure. The member states made CREST – a 
member state-led advisory body for R&D issues – responsible for measuring and analyzing the progress on 
these targets (De Ruiter forthcoming).  
4 In total 472 documents were coded, of which 131 documents were discussed in the British Upper and 
Lower House, and 341 documents in the Dutch Upper and Lower House.   13   
(see previous section). Hence, on the basis of the third and fourth hypothesis one would 
expect that the Dutch parliament is better informed about the policies to which OMCs are 
applied, the institutional design of OMCs, and the output of OMCs (i.e. Joint Reports and 
NAPs). 
In previous contributions to the literature on the involvement of parliaments in 
OMCs, no distinction is made between national governments informing parliament about 
the existence of the OMC and/or parliamentarians actively using the information from the 
OMC arena to hold the government to account. This study measures the involvement of 
parliaments in a more precise way. The parliamentary documents were coded along the 
lines of four categories of references to the OMC. These categories were identified 
through a pre-study of the documents collected for the Dutch Upper and Lower Houses in 
the case of the OMC education. First, general references to the development of an OMC 
in infrastructural terms (i.e. the introduction of guidelines, indicators, benchmarks, 
reporting, and peer learning activities) were put in a category with the label ‘informing 
infrastructure’. This type of reference is used by the government to inform parliament on 
developments with regard to the OMC that are not directly related to policies. Neutral 
references to policies discussed in OMCs – i.e. without mentioning the policy 
performance of member states – form the second category. This type of reference is used 
by governments to inform parliament of policies discussed in OMCs and is labeled 
‘informing policy’. The third category consists of a positive reference to the performance 
of national policies in an OMC. The government is likely to refer to the OMC in this way 
in order to ‘fame’ its own policies. Accordingly, the third category is labeled ‘faming’ 
and sheds light on the control of national government over the information flow coming   14   
from the OMC arena. The fourth category is the mirror picture of the third category and 
consists of a negative reference to the performance of national policies in an OMC. This 
category is labeled ‘shaming’. By categorizing the data obtained from the coding of the 
parliamentary documents, sufficient insights were obtained to test the first hypothesis.  
  Informing infrastructure  Informing policy  Shaming  Faming 
NL OMC education 66  55  23  14 
NL OMC e-Europe 49  117  8  16 
NL OMC R&D  51  111  52  24 
UK OMC education  39  35  6  5 
UK OMC e-Europe 33  52  1  6 
UK OMC R&D  14  27  9  2 
Total  252  397  99  67 
Table 1: Amount of references in documents discussed in the Dutch and British Upper 
and Lower House in the period 1999-2007 across four coding categories. 
 
Through the study of Commission and Council documents and the NAPs drawn 
up by the Dutch and British government, insights were obtained on the presence of 
simple benchmarks and ranking of the policy performance of member states on 
indicators. These data proved insightful for assessing the second hypothesis. For the 
assessment of the third and fourth hypothesis, information on the differences between the 
Dutch and the British political systems were derived from secondary literature on 
consensus and majoritarian democracies, and from classifications on the strength of EU 
affairs committees of national parliaments.  
 
Results 
 
The parliamentary discussions in which information was used from the OMC arena took 
place in the European Affairs Committees of the British and Dutch parliament. The total   15   
amount of references to the OMCs varies considerably between the parliamentary 
committees of the two member states (see figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Total amount of references for the Netherlands (NL) and the United Kingdom 
(UK). 
 
In order to assess the four hypotheses, a more detailed picture of the variation between 
OMCs and parliaments needs to be provided. In this section the distribution of the data 
across the four categories of parliamentary involvement is discussed. 
 
Information infrastructure  
When we look at the information provided by the Dutch government to the Dutch 
parliament on the development of the institutional design of the OMC at the European 
level, the OMCs adopted on the e-Europe and R&D domains show a decreasing trend   16   
after peaks in respectively 2002 and 2003. This is in line with the actual developments on 
the EU level (De Ruiter 2007). The reporting on the institutional design of the OMC 
education to the Dutch parliament shows several peaks (2003, 2005, 2007), with a 
starting point in reporting comparable to the OMC R&D (around 2002). The peaks in 
reporting on the institutional design of the OMC education can be explained by 
continuous restructuring and development of benchmarks, indicators and reporting 
requirements at the EU level. Hence, there is a good fit between what is reported by the 
government to parliament and the actual EU developments with regard to the three 
OMCs. 
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Figure 2: Information on institutional design of OMCs provided by the Dutch and British 
governments.  
 
The reporting of the British government to parliament on the development of the 
institutional design of the OMC e-Europe shows peaks around 2000 and 2005. The latter   17   
peak in reporting cannot be explained by progress in the institutional design of the OMC 
e-Europe but is related with the Council presidency of the UK in 2005. At the time the 
UK took over the EU helm, one of the points on the Council agenda was the agreement 
on a new e-Europe Action Plan. The UK presidency  made reaching agreement on this 
plan one of its priorities, and reported to the British parliament on the institutional design 
of the OMC e-Europe. The reporting on the development of the institutional design of the 
OMC R&D and OMC education increased in parallel with the development of the 
infrastructure of these OMCs on the EU level, i.e. after 2002. However, the British 
parliament was never fully informed about the developments in the institutional design of 
the OMC R&D, with no additional reporting in 2003 – a year in which the infrastructure 
of the OMC R&D developed rapidly. The government did consider it worthwhile to 
inform parliament about the increased reporting on R&D investments in the new National 
Reform Programmes, leading to a peak in 2006. The reporting on the OMC education 
showed peaks in 2003 and high scores in the period 2005-2007. This is in line with the 
EU developments with regard to the infrastructural developments of the OMC education. 
 With regard to the information provided by the government to the parliament on 
the institutional design of OMCs, there are clear differences between the Dutch and the 
British parliament. The Dutch government keeps over time and across OMCs the 
parliament up-to-date on the institutional developments on the EU level. This is mirrored 
in consistently higher scores across the three OMCs for the Dutch case. 
 
Informing policy   18   
The information provided by the Dutch government to parliament on the policies on 
which OMCs were adopted show a large amount of variation across OMCs. The 
reporting on the OMC e-Europe shows that government informed parliament extensively 
on what issues the method would touch. This is especially visible in 2000, around the 
time of the internet bubble. After 2001 the attention on the EU level for internet policy 
decreased rapidly due to the burst of the internet-bubble (see also De Ruiter 2008). This 
is mirrored in lower scores on the category ‘informing policy’ after 2001-2002. The 
reporting on the policies the OMC R&D and OMC education touch upon shows an 
increasing trend, with more attention for R&D policies. 
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Figure 3: Information provided by the Dutch and British governments on policies the 
OMC is touching upon.  
   19   
The information provided by the British government to the House of Commons and 
House of Lords on the three OMCs follows a similar pattern as for the Netherlands, with 
a decrease in reporting on internet policies and the OMC (except for 2005) after the 
internet-bubble bursted, and an increasing trend in reporting for the OMC R&D and 
OMC education. The peak in reporting in the case of the OMC R&D can be explained by 
more attention for the inclusion of R&D issues in the revised Lisbon strategy. The 2005-
peak in reporting for the OMC e-Europe – the largest contrast with the Dutch case – can 
be explained by the importance the UK government attached to reaching agreement on 
the new e-Europe Action Plan. 
 When we look at the differences between the British and Dutch case, a similar 
pattern can be observed as for the ‘informing infrastructure’ category. The Dutch 
government provides more information on the policies the OMC is touching upon to the 
Upper and Lower House when compared with the British government. 
 
Shaming 
The most striking findings on the shaming of Dutch policies with information  from the 
OMC arena, are the high peaks for the OMC R&D in 2004 and 2006. These peaks can be 
explained by attention given by parliamentarians for the relative underperformance of 
Dutch R&D policies with regard to private investments in R&D, especially in the case of 
small- and medium sized enterprises. Also the OMC education has two ‘shaming-peaks’ 
– in 2003 and 2007 – both related with the high percentage of drop-outs in the Dutch 
school system. The shaming on Dutch internet policies remains very low through time.    20   
The high shaming of Dutch policies through the OMC education and OMC R&D 
is related with two factors. First, Dutch policies are poorly performing on some 
benchmarks and indicators included in the OMC education and OMC R&D. This results 
in critical assessments of Dutch policies in Joint Reports of the Commission and the 
Council, which are repeated in the NAPs and National Reform Programmes drawn up by 
the Dutch government. Two reasons can be identified for why also government is 
referring to the bad performance of policies for which it is responsible. First, it is the duty 
of the government to inform the parliament of important EU developments and the 
influence on the national policy-making process, even if it weakens the position of the 
government vis-à-vis parliament. Second, the negative messages on the Dutch policies 
voiced in the OMC arena and reported to parliament are used by the government to 
legitimize new policies that are under way or are initiated by the incumbent government.  
 A second reason for the high shaming scores in the OMC education and OMC 
R&D is related with the institutional design of both OMCs – a point closely related to the 
argument made by Benz and underlying the second hypothesis. The difference between 
on the one hand the OMC R&D and OMC education and the OMC e-Europe on the other 
is that the former two OMCs have few, but simple and focused benchmarks. The 
presence of this type of benchmark increases the amount of information that is easy to 
interpret, and can directly be used by parliamentarians to ask questions about the 
underperformance of Dutch policies.   21   
Shaming
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Figure 4: Amount of references in parliamentary documents to OMC information used to 
criticize national policies of the incumbent government. 
 
 In the British case shaming is almost absent in the case of the OMC e-Europe, but 
more prominent in the OMC education and, especially, the OMC R&D. In the case of the 
OMC education use was made of the benchmark on foreign languages to critically assess 
the situation in the UK and propose solutions for the underperformance of British 
education policies. In the case of the OMC R&D attention was paid in 2006 to the 
underinvestment in R&D in the UK. However, even the shaming in the OMC R&D 
remains limited to a maximum of 5 references a year. 
 When the two parliamentary systems are compared, one directly notes similarities 
in the low shaming in the case of the OMC e-Europe, and the considerable higher 
shaming scores for the OMC education and OMC R&D. Apart from similarities across 
OMCs between the British and Dutch parliaments, there are also differences in   22   
parliamentary involvement between the two member states. Dutch parliamentarians make 
more use of information from the OMC arena to critically assess the performance of 
national R&D and education policies than the British parliamentarians do. This is 
mirrored in substantially higher shaming scores for the Netherlands in the case of the 
OMC R&D and OMC education. 
 
Faming 
The scores for faming are lower than the shaming scores for both parliaments under 
study. This is related with the fact that faming is exercised by the government only, 
whereas shaming is exercised by both the government and parliament. For the 
Netherlands, only in the case of the OMC R&D faming peaks of above 5 documents a 
year can be observed. The Commission and member states identified several Dutch R&D 
policies as best practices, which increased faming considerably. The Dutch government 
was eager to emphasize the high productivity of Dutch science and technology, the 
outstanding quality of Dutch knowledge-intensive services, and the appropriate policy 
mix in the Netherlands to increase R&D investments. The success of the Dutch 
innovation platform – one of the priorities of Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende – was 
also mentioned by the government.  
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Figure 5: Amount of references in parliamentary documents to OMC information used to 
emphasize the good performance of national policies of the incumbent government. 
 
 Faming of national policies through information gathered from the OMC arena is 
low in the British case. The only remarkable finding for the UK is the relatively high 
amount of faming by the British government to its own internet policies. This emphasis 
can be explained by the fact that the UK Council presidency in 2005 made the agreement 
of the e-Europe Action Plan one of its priorities. However, just as we saw earlier in the 
case of the other three categories of involvement of parliaments, the scores on the faming 
category for the British case are substantially lower than for the Dutch case.  
 
Conclusion 
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The empirical results show that there is a good fit between the policy developments on 
the EU level with regard to the OMC and its output, and the reporting by the Dutch and 
British government to the Upper and Lower Houses. The fit is slightly better in the Dutch 
case, with a low amount of reporting by the British government on the institutional 
design of the OMC R&D in a phase of rapid infrastructural developments at the EU level. 
Moreover, parliaments are not hindered by their governments in using information from 
the OMC arena. In the Dutch case the government even plays a pro-active role and 
informs the parliament regularly on the positive and negative messages on the Dutch 
policies voiced in the OMC arena. This allows parliamentarians to use information from 
the OMC arena to criticize government. Hence, this study does not provide empirical 
support for the first hypothesis, which predicted that members of parliament are unable 
and unwilling to scrutinize OMCs. 
Second, the data on the OMC R&D and OMC education show that a combination 
of bad performing national policies and few but simple and focused benchmarks 
generates information that can directly be used by parliamentarians as point of departure 
to address policy problems at the national level. This ensured a stronger involvement of 
the Dutch and British parliament in these two OMCs across the four categories. However, 
the variation in shaming scores between OMCs was less in the case of the British House 
of Lords and House of Commons. The low scores for the OMC e-Europe indicate that the 
infrastructure of an OMC should be developed above a certain threshold in order to 
generate enough information on national policies so that it can come through in 
parliament. This provides empirical support for the second hypothesis.   25   
 As expected on the basis of the third hypothesis, a government in a consensus 
democracy has a more cooperative attitude towards parliament and, hence, is providing 
information on the institutional design of the OMC, the policies on which the OMC is 
adopted, and the positive/negative messages from the OMC on national policies. In the 
British case the information provided by the government to the House of Commons and 
House of Lords is considerably less, which lowers the possibility for British 
parliamentarians to use information from the OMC arena to critically asses the 
performance of national policies.  
Fourth, both in the case of the UK and the Netherlands, the discussions in which 
information was used from the OMC arena took place in EU affairs committees. The 
stronger involvement of the Dutch parliament in the three OMCs when compared to the 
British parliament is in line with the difference in strength of EU affairs committees of 
these parliaments reported on in the literature. Although it is not possible on the basis of 
the data to assess whether there is a causal link, the patterns in involvement are fully in 
line with the fourth hypothesis. 
This study has several limitations. First, this study only measured the messages on 
national policies that can be identified in Joint Reports and NAPs. It may be possible that 
issues were discussed in dense peer learning networks at the EU level and were blocked 
by the Dutch and British governments from coming through in the national parliament. 
This study did not measure this type of blocking power of governments. Second, the 
scores for shaming and faming in parliamentary documents reach a maximum of 14 
documents a year. Hence, the impact of faming and shaming on the Dutch and British 
policy making process should not be exaggerated. However, especially in the Dutch case   26   
parliamentarians are actively using information from the Joint Reports and NAPs to 
critically assess the performance of policies initiated by the incumbent government. In a 
way, the OMC R&D and OMC education empowered Dutch parliamentarians by 
increasing the information necessary to hold the government to account for the 
performance of their policies. 
 Although this study looked at the variation in parliamentary involvement across 
two member states and three OMCs, there are several variables and cases not included in 
this study. An example of a country-specific variable that can be expected to influence 
the degree of interest of national parliaments in OMCs, is the competence allocation 
between national and sub-national state authorities in federal states. Several German 
Länder have offices in Brussels to follow policy developments at the EU level, which 
prevents the German federal government to control the flow of information from the 
OMC arena to the national/Länder parliaments (Büchs and Friedrich 2005: 279-280; 
Kröger 2007: 573). Moreover, OMCs are also adopted on policy fields that are not related 
with the knowledge-based society theme. Next to older OMCs such as the OMC 
employment, OMC social inclusion and OMC pensions, there are also OMCs currently in 
development at the EU level, such as the OMC health care, and OMC culture. Future 
studies will be able to include the latter two OMCs to show whether parliaments learned 
from scrutinising the OMCs on the social and knowledge-based society fields in the last 
8-9 years and became better equipped to take a more pro-active approach. 
 
References 
   27   
Benz, A. (2007) ‘Accountable Multilevel Governance by the Open Method of 
Coordination?’, European Law Journal 14(4): 505-522. 
 
Borrás, S. and T. Conzelmann (2007) ‘Democracy, Legitimacy and Soft Modes of 
Governance in the EU: The Empirical Turn’, Journal of European Integration 29(5): 
531-548. 
 
Büchs, M. and Friedrich, D. (2005) ‘Surface integration. The national action plans for 
employment and social inclusion in Germany’, in J. Zeitlin and P. Pochet with L. 
Magnusson (eds),  The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European 
Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 249–85. 
 
Chalmers, D. and Lodge, M. (2003), 'The Open Method of Co-ordination and the 
European Welfare State', (London: London School of Economics and Political Science). 
 
Commission of the European Union (2004) Progress towards the common objectives in 
education and training: indicators and benchmarks. Brussels. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/progress_towards_common_objectives_e
n.pdf (accessed 31 March 2008). 
 
Council of the European Union (2000) Presidency Conclusions Lisbon European 
Council, 23-24 March. Brussels. Available at   28   
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-
r1.en0.htm (accessed 31 March 2008). 
 
De la Porte, C. and Nanz, P. (2004) ‘The OMC – a deliberative-democratic mode of 
governance? The cases of employment and pensions’, Journal of European Public Policy 
11(2): 267–88. 
 
De Ruiter, R. (2007) ‘To Prevent a Shift of Competences. Developing the Open Method 
of Coordination: Education, Research and Development, Social Inclusion, e-Europe’, 
unpublished manuscript dissertation, European University Institute. 
 
De Ruiter, R. (2008) ‘Developing Multilateral Surveillance Tools in the EU’,  West 
European Politics 31(5): 896-914. 
 
De Ruiter, R. (2009) ‘Multilateral Surveillance in Education by the OMC’, in A.P Jakobi, 
K. Martens, K.D. Wolf (eds), Education in Political Science. Discovering a neglected 
field, Routledge. 
 
De Ruiter, R. (forthcoming) ‘Variations on a theme. Governing the knowledge-based 
society in the EU through methods of open coordination in education and R&D’ 
   29   
Duina, F. and T. Raunio (2007) ‘The open method of co-ordination and national 
parliaments: further marginalization or new opportunities?’, Journal of European Public 
Policy 14(4): 489-506. 
 
Friedrich, D. (2006) ‘Policy Process, Governance and Democracy in the EU: the Case of 
the Open Method of Co-ordination on social inclusion’ Policy & Politics 34(2): 367-83. 
 
Gallagher, M., Laver, M. & Mair, P. (2000)  Representative Government in Modern 
Europe (New York: McGraw Publishing Co). 
 
Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2001) Comparative Government and Politics: an introduction 
(New York: Macmillan). 
 
Hegeland, H. & Neuhold, C. (2002) Parliamentary participation in EU affairs in Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden: Newcomers with different approaches,  European Integration 
Online Papers, 6(10). 
 
Jacobsson, K. (2005) ‘Trying to reform the best pupils in the class? The open method of 
co-ordination in Sweden and Denmark’, in J. Zeitlin and P. Pochet with L. Magnusson 
(eds), The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European Employment and 
Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 107–36. 
   30   
Kerber, W. and M. Eckhardt (2007) ‘Policy learning in Europe: the open method of 
coordination and laboratory federalism’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(2): 227-
247. 
 
Kröger, S. (2007) ‘The End of Democracy as We Know it? The Legitimacy Deficits of 
Bureaucratic Social Policy Governance’, Journal of European Integration 29(5): 565-
582. 
 
López-Santana, M. (2006) ‘The domestic implications of European soft law: framing and 
transmitting change in employment policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 13(4): 
481–99. 
 
Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government, Forms and Performance in 
Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
 
Maurer, A. & Wessels, W. (eds.) (2001) National Parliaments on their ways to Europe: 
Losers or Latecomers? (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft). 
 
Raunio, T. (2005) Holding Governments Accountable in European Affairs: Explaining 
Cross-National Variation, Journal of Legislative Studies, 11(3-4), pp. 319--342. 
 
Raunio, T. (2006) ‘Does OMC Really Benefit National Parliaments?’, European Law 
Journal, 12 (1): 130-31.    31   
 
Radulova, E. (2007) ‘The OMC: An Opaque Method of Consideration or Deliberative 
Governance in Action?’, Journal of European Integration 29(3): 363-380. 
 
Smismans, S. (2004) ‘EU Employment Policy: Decentralisation of Centralisation through 
the Open Method of Coordination?’ (EUI Working Paper LAW). 
 
Tans, O. (2007) The Dutch Parliament and the EU: A Constitutional Analysis, in: O. 
Tans, C. Zoethout & J. Peters (eds.) National Parliaments and European Democracy. A 
Bottom-up Approach to European Constitutionalism, pp. 163--180 (Groningen: Europa 
Law Publishing) 
 
Tsakatika, M. (2007) ‘A Parliamentary Dimension for EU Soft Governance’, Journal of 
European Integration 29(5): 549-564. 
 
Visser, J. (2005) ‘The OMC as selective amplifier for national strategies of reform: what 
the Netherlands want to learn from Europe’, in J. Zeitlin and P. Pochet with L. 
Magnusson (eds),  The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European 
Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 173–215. 